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The “Weaponization” of Corpus Linguistics:
Testing Heller’s Linguistic Claims
I. I NTRODUCTION
In its controversial landmark decision of District of Columbia v.
Heller,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an individual
right to carry operational firearms in the home for the purpose of selfdefense.2 To do so, the Court relied on the assumption that the right
to bear arms was originally understood to encompass the actual carrying of personal weapons (in case of confrontation).3 But the Court
acknowledged that at the time of the Founding, the phrase bear arms
also had “an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different than its
natural meaning: ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight,’ or ‘to
wage war.’”4 Justice John Paul Stevens adopted this so-called idiomatic
sense of bear arms in his dissent, and concluded that the Second
Amendment protects the narrower right of the people to maintain
well-regulated state militias.5
This Note introduces new corpus linguistics research that suggests
both Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion relied on inaccurate historical linguistic claims.
First, this Note finds that contrary to Justice Stevens’s assertion,
there is currently no evidence to support the claim that keep and bear
arms was a legal term of art or that the Second Amendment established
a “unitary right.” Rather, it is more likely that the Second Amendment
protects both a right of the people to “keep arms” and a separate right
of the people to “bear arms.”
Second, because most corpus linguistics scholars that have analyzed the Second Amendment have focused on whether bear arms was

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 635.
Id. at 584, 589.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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used more often in “military” or “collective” contexts than “individual”
contexts, most of the available evidence has been skewed in favor of
the conclusion that the Amendment protects a more limited collective
militia right rather than a more expansive individual right. By contrast,
this Note focuses on dividing the recorded uses of bear arms into the
two camps delineated by the Court: the more literal “carrying” sense
(what Justice Scalia referred to as the “natural” sense) and the specialized military sense (what both the majority and dissenting opinions referred to as the “idiomatic” sense). While this Note’s results finding
that the phrase bear arms was recorded more often in its specialized
sense than its carrying sense in the latter half of the eighteenth century
arguably still support the conclusions of this past research, they also
suggest that the Heller Court’s individual rights interpretation of the
Amendment is more defensible than these researchers have suggested.
Specifically, this Note’s research shows that the carrying sense of bear
arms made up approximately one-fifth to two-fifths of recorded uses
of the term in Founding Era American texts.6
Third and finally, this Note confirms that it is emphatically not
true that bear arms bore its specialized sense (“idiomatic meaning”) in
the Founding Era only when followed by the preposition against.
Part I discusses popular theories of the Second Amendment and
explains which reading the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in District of
Columbia v. Heller. Part II explains how original ordinary meaning is
important to the Court’s continued interpretation of the Amendment
and how corpus linguistics can help scholars and judges uncover that
original ordinary meaning. Part III describes recent corpus linguistics
research on the Second Amendment. Part IV identifies a few of Heller’s linguistic claims and explains how this Note used corpus linguistics to test those claims. Part V discusses the results of those tests. Part
VI acknowledges the limits of this Note’s conclusions and suggests areas for future research. The Note then concludes.

6. The searches for this Note were conducted near the end of 2018. For details on which
texts were considered, see Part II.D.
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II. R ULES OF E NGAGEMENT : C OMPETING T HEORIES OF THE
S ECOND A MENDMENT

A. The Collective Rights, Individual Rights, and Insurrectionist
Theories of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that,
“[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”7 Broadly speaking, there are three popular theories of what
the Second Amendment was designed to do and what it protects today.
The first theory is sometimes referred to as the “collective rights”
theory and posits that the Amendment was meant to protect state militias (which the U.S. Constitution subjugated to the federal government in several clauses) from the new national government. As a consequence, individual citizens under this theory have—at most—a right
to possess weapons in connection with service in those state militias.
Prior to Heller, the collective rights theory had the support of the Supreme Court (three times over),8 as well as the scholarly consensus before the late 1980s.
The second theory is the “individual rights” theory, which argues
that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” protects the individual right to possess and carry weapons for the purposes of self-defense. This theory has been championed by conservative scholars like
Joyce Lee Malcolm9 and liberals such as the Pulitzer Prize-winning
historian Leonard Levy10 and Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe.11
The third theory is something of a hybrid and is sometimes called
the “insurrectionist theory.” Like the individual rights theory, the in-

7. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
8. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
9. See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).
10. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133–49 (1999).
11. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 898, 901–02 (3d ed.
2000).
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surrectionist theory favors private gun ownership. But like the collective rights theory, it posits that the right has little to do with individual
self-defense. The insurrectionist theory argues that the Amendment
protects the right of the people collectively to bear arms, but for the
much more serious purpose of keeping a tyrannical government in
check. This camp is the domain of conservative scholars like Stephen
Halbrook12 and prominent liberal law professors such as Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas13 and Akhil Reed Amar of Yale.14 At a
high level, these insurrectionist theorists could be regarded as cousins
of the individual rights theorists.
When the Supreme Court reentered the Second Amendment fray
in Heller, the United States Courts of Appeals were split on the correct
theory of the Second Amendment, with three circuits adopting an individual rights reading and ten circuits adopting one version or another
of the collective rights reading.15

12. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 77 (1984).

THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF

13. While Professor Levinson’s first foray might have been less definitive, see Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989), he has since clarified
that he believes more specifically in the “insurrectionist” view of the Second Amendment, see
Sanford Levinson, The NRA Didn’t Help, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2016) (“I have been publicly critical of Justice Scalia’s majority argument in the Heller case precisely because, like most lawyers,
whether conservative or liberal, he preferred to ignore the ‘insurrectionist’ origins of the amendment in favor of a tendentious and I think insupportable rewriting of American legal history
turning the amendment, as understood in 1791, into the protection of an individual right to defend oneself against criminals trying to break into one’s home.”).
14. See Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 11, 1999)
https://newrepublic.com/article/73718/second-thoughts (“A modern translation of the amendment might thus be: ‘An armed and militarily trained citizenry being conducive to freedom, the
right of the electorate to organize itself militarily shall not be infringed.’ Call this the communitarian reading as opposed to the statist and libertarian readings that dominate modern discourse.
Statists anachronistically read the ‘militia’ to mean the government (the paid professional officialdom) rather than the people (the ordinary citizenry). Equally anachronistically, libertarians
read ‘the people’ to mean atomized private persons, each hunting in his own private Idaho, rather
than the citizenry acting collectively. But, when the Constitution speaks of ‘the people’ rather
than ‘persons,’ the collective connotation is primary.”).
15. PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2009).
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B. Self-Defense or State Militias? The Debate in District of
Columbia v. Heller
By the mid-2000s, the District of Columbia had effectively banned
handgun possession by first criminalizing the carrying of unregistered
firearms and then completely prohibiting handgun registration.16 The
District also required a license to carry handguns and mandated that
residents keep all firearms “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device” unless they were kept at a place of business or being immediately used for recreational purposes.17
Challenger Dick Heller was a D.C. special police officer who legally carried a handgun while he was on duty in the District.18 After
the city rejected his request to register a handgun he wished to keep in
his home, Heller sued the District in federal district court, claiming
that the Second Amendment protected his right to carry a functional
firearm in the home without a license.19 Heller sought to enjoin the
city’s ban on handgun registration, as well as the licensing and triggerlock requirements “insofar as [they] prohibit[ed] the use of ‘functional
firearms within the home.’”20 The United States District Court dismissed Heller’s claim,21 but a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess functional firearms
in the home for the purposes of self-defense.22
The Supreme Court affirmed the panel’s decision.23 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, described the introductory portion of the Second Amendment (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) as the “prefatory clause” and the second portion
of the Amendment (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008).
Id. at 575.

Id.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576.
Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395, 399–401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
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shall not be infringed”) as the “operative clause.”24 Relying on the operative clause’s text and history, he found that the phrase to keep and
bear arms works with the Amendment’s prefatory clause to “guarantee
the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”25 While the Court declined to outline the exact contours of this
right, Justice Scalia concluded that, “whatever else it leaves to future
evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the right of lawabiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.”26
Justice Stevens disagreed. In a dissenting opinion joined by three
other Justices, he argued that because “[t]he Second Amendment was
adopted to protect the right of the people of each of the several States
to maintain a well-regulated militia[,]” it protects only “the right to
keep and bear arms for certain military purposes,”—i.e., it does not
protect “the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”27
So in Heller the Supreme Court lent support to two of the main
camps in the Second Amendment debate—the collective rights theory
and the individual rights theory. Post-Heller, the battle for the correct
history and interpretation of the Second Amendment has continued,
with scholars and pundits casting and recasting arguments in support
of either the individual rights and insurrectionist theories28 or the collective rights theory.29

Id. at 577.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See David French, Of Course the Second Amendment Protects an Individual Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 13, 2016 8:00 AM) https://www.nationalreview.com
/2016/04/second-amendment-protects-individual-right-keep-bear-arms/; David Harsanyi, The
Second Amendment Has Always Been an Individual Right, THE FEDERALIST (Nov. 29, 2018)
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/second-amendment-always-individual-right/.
29. CHARLES, supra note 15.
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III. C ORPUS L INGUISTICS : A C LUE TO O RIGINAL , O RDINARY
M EANING

A. The Importance of Original, Ordinary Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation
As the Heller Court put it, “[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary . . . meaning.”30 Judges, including the Justices of the
Supreme Court, have increasingly purported to be guided by the original, ordinary meaning of the text of the Constitution. Heller is a good
example of this—even the four dissenting Justices relied in part on
what they understood to be the original understanding of “the right to
keep and bear arms.”31
If it is true that most judges would not align themselves with a
strong Justice Clarence Thomas-style originalism or even a more precedent-fearing Justice Scalia-style originalism, it is also true that to a
certain extent, “[w]e are all originalists”32 now.33 Most judges seem to
believe that the starting point of any constitutional inquiry is “the original communicative content of the words of the Constitution.”34 Most
30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
Of course, what “ordinary meaning” actually means is not always clear, as Utah Supreme Court
Associate Chief Justice Thomas R. Lee and Stephen Mouritsen have pointed out. Thomas R. Lee
& Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 798–800 (2018) (giving
examples of how judges have used “ordinary meaning” to refer to possible meaning, common
meaning, most frequent meaning, exclusive meaning, and prototypical meaning).
31. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The view of the Amendment we
took in Miller—that it protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but
that it does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of
weapons—is both the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most
faithful to the history of its adoption.”).
32. Jonathan H. Adler, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST,
(June 29, 2010, 1:18PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
06201o/o6/29/
AR2010062902652AR210062902652.html (quoting Justice Elena Kagan as saying, “We are all
originalists,” in her 2010 confirmation hearing).
33. This is not an attempt to broaden the traditional formal or colloquial definitions of
“originalism” to the point of meaninglessness—rather, it is an attempt to show that even many
of those who would normally not consider themselves “originalists” are still interested in discovering and considering original communicative content.
34. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
261, 270 (2019). Of course, Justice Lee and Professor Phillips are making the more modest claim
that all originalists (including original intentions originalists and original methods originalists)
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even seem to agree that this original communicative content is the ending point of constitutional interpretation where such content is
“clearly established.”35
To be sure, there may be a great deal of dispute among “originalists” (again, speaking broadly) about whether the original understanding of a Constitutional text in a given case is constraining—or even
determinable. But there seem to be just as few judges willing to say that
the original understanding of the Constitution is not fixed (and therefore, irrelevant) as there are judges willing to say that the text of a statute is not fixed (and therefore, irrelevant).36 So the original understanding or communicative content of a text is of interest to anyone
called upon to interpret a Constitutional provision—however large a
role that interpreter deems that linguistic determination should ultimately play. Truly, then, “[a]ll the action in . . . constitutional interpretation is . . . after the threshold inquiry into original communicative
content.”37
Assuming judges can discover what the original communicative
content of a Constitutional provision is, how should they go about it?
One particularly promising and powerful tool is corpus linguistics.

are in some degree original public meaning originalists, not that all constitutional interpreters
are originalists.
35. Id.
36. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (contrasting the “Fixation Thesis” with the “Constraint Principle” and arguing that perhaps a better definition of a living constitutionalist is one
who either (1) “accept[s] that the linguistic meaning (or more precisely, communicative content)
of the constitutional text is fixed” but that the “legal meaning (or more precisely legal content)
of the Constitution . . . changes over time,” or (2) “accept[s] both fixation and constraint, but
believe[s] that the actual meaning of specific provisions of the constitutional text is underdeterminate . . . .”). Even the late Judge Harry Pregerson, who infamously declared in his confirmation
hearing that, “[I]f I had to follow my conscience or the law, I would follow my conscience,” never
actually declared the original communicative content of words irrelevant—he just thought it
wasn’t determinative in all cases. Emily Langer, Henry Pregerson, Federal Judge Who Placed
Conscience Before Law, Dies at 94, WASH. POST (November 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/harry-pregerson-federal-judge-who-placed-conscience-beforelaw-dies-at-94/2017/11/30/03ee252a-d5e1-11e7-95bfdf7c19270879_story.html?utm_term=.f17ab5b033b5.
37. Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 266 (emphasis added).
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B. Corpus Linguistics: A Way to Original, Ordinary Meaning
In simplest terms, corpus linguistics is the empirical analysis of
how a given group of people (a “speech community”) used a given
word or phrase at a given time. Corpus linguists use large databases of
words called corpora (singular: corpus) that are comprised of the text
of newspapers, books, speeches, television and movie transcripts, etc.,
from the desired time period to see how a speech community actually
used words—how often, and in what context.38 The legal application is
obvious—by looking at how words naturally occurred in a speech community’s past communications, judges can more objectively approximate how that speech community would (or should) have understood
those words if and when they became the subject of a heated legal dispute.39 Thus, a corpus linguistics analysis enhances the objectivity of
legal interpretation’s search for original, “ordinary meaning”40 in at
least two interrelated ways.
First, a corpus linguistics analysis increases accuracy and determinacy because judges can see how words are used in hundreds, thousands, or even millions of different contexts; they don’t have to base
linguistic claims on a few isolated literary examples or dictionary definitions (or worse, their own naked intuition). Without corpus data,
judges are not just operating with limited—and therefore less reliable
38. See James Heilpern, Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term
of Art Determinations in Statutes, 58 JURIMETRICS 377, 389 (2018).
39. In this way, corpus linguistics analysis avoids a common criticism of relying on legislative history—namely, that it is susceptible to individuals “salting the record,” or underhandedly
dictating the meaning of a word or phrase by preemptively utilizing it in a new and creative way.
Whatever the prevalence of this “salting the record” problem actually is when it comes to legislative history, it is impossible to imagine that enough members of a speech community would (or
could) correctly anticipate a discrete linguistic legal controversy enough to systematically change
their use of that language just to alter the outcome of that particular case. In fact, because corpus
linguistics looks at how words were used in specific moments in time, it specifically guards against
“linguistic drift” (the phenomenon that words can and do change their meanings over time). See
Lee & Phillips, supra note 34 at 265.
40. Again, what “ordinary meaning” actually means is not always clear. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 798–800. But whatever we mean by “ordinary meaning” in any given case
or context, any time we invoke it we are making some claim about the frequency with which the
word or phrase is used. Id. at 831–32 (“[C]orpora can be used to measure the statistical frequency
of words and word senses in a given speech community and over a given time period. Whether
we regard the ordinary meaning of a given word to be the possible, common, or the most common sense of that word in a given context, linguistic corpora allows us to determine empirically
where a contested sense of a term falls on that continuum.”).
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and representative—information, they are leaving themselves more
susceptible to motivated reasoning and confirmation bias.41 It is a lot
easier to skew data (innocently or otherwise) when your analysis is
based on texts of your own choosing.
Second, corpus linguistics analysis improves the transparency of
the original, ordinary meaning inquiry because it is a replicable and
therefore falsifiable enterprise.42 Citing corpus linguistics as the basis
for a claim regarding the frequency or ordinariness of a term is the
equivalent of showing one’s work. When a court claims that a word
had a given meaning at a given time because of a corpus search, experts,
higher courts, and other third-party observers can look at the court’s
methodology and data and perform their own corpus linguistics analysis to verify the court’s results and conclusions.43 (Unfortunately, this
also means that when a recent law school graduate performs a corpus
search and makes certain claims about the Second Amendment, much
more qualified academics can review and critique his work.)
In short, corpus linguistics can enhance the accuracy of judges’ linguistic determinations and help constrain their natural biases.

C. Corpus Linguistics: A Tool as Old as Time
“Corpus linguistics” might sound strange and intimidating—not
unlike a Harry Potter incantation44—but the reality is that each of us
performs a kind of corpus linguistics in his or her head every day. Every
time someone speaks to us, we are taking those spoken words and giving them meaning based on—among other things45—how we have

41. See id. at 867–68 (“Without [corpus linguistics], judges will tap into their linguistic
memory to make assessments about the frequency or prototypicality of a given sense of a statutory
term. Such recourse to memory and judicial intuition is neither transparent nor replicable. Nothing is statistically worse than one data point—especially a biased one. The potential for motivated
reasoning is evident.”).
42. See id. at 829.
43. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 292–93 (“With traditional originalist tools,
there’s a take-my-word-for-it element. But corpus analysis democratizes the inquiry, opening up
the data and the conclusions drawn from it to everyone. No one has to take the originalist’s word
for it. Anyone can look at the same data and try to replicate or falsify the conclusions.”).
44. See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 238
(2005) (“There were many crossings-out and alterations, but finally, crammed into a corner of a
page, the scribble: Levicorpus (nvbl).”).
45. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 815–16 (“Whenever we engage in the act of
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heard and used those words in dozens, hundreds, or thousands of contexts. In this sense, all formal or computerized corpus linguistics aims
to do is make that root database or corpus more representative of the
relevant population. In other words, when we perform a corpus search
based on texts from a targeted speech community, we are estimating
what those words mean based on the shared experiences of—ideally—
all the people in the relevant speech community, rather than the linguistic experiences of just one person. You could say corpus linguistics
is an attempt to crowdsource linguistic intuition.
Even when it comes to corpus linguistics’ application to particular
cases and controversies, this “new” field is simply a more robust and
technologically advanced version of what judges and legal scholars
have been trying to accomplish for decades: determine the meaning of
words by looking at how they are used in other relevant contexts.
For example, in Muscarello v. United States, Justice Stephen
Breyer “surveyed modern press usage . . . by searching computerized
newspaper databases—both the New York Times data base in
Lexis/Nexis, and the ‘U.S. News’ data base in Westlaw” to confirm the
Court’s interpretation of carry as it pertained to guns.46 Likewise, in
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., Justice Samuel Alito conducted
an extensive “survey of . . . relevant dictionaries” to determine that the
“ordinary or common meaning” of interpreter did not include translators of written texts.47
And Supreme Court Justices are not alone. Judge Richard Posner
conducted a Google search in United States v. Costello—”based on
the supposition that the number of hits per term is a rough index of
the frequency of its use”—to conclude that “allowing your boyfriend

communication—whenever a speaker speaks and a hearer hears—our minds take in the relevant
interpretative information at once. We take account of the formal aspects of an utterance (its
lexical, syntactic, and semantic content), as well as the pragmatic (in the linguistic sense of the
term) aspects of the utterance (for example, the physical or social setting in which it is uttered).
We interpret an utterance as part of a community of speakers of a language (with shared linguistic
conventions and a shared understanding of different linguistic registers), and we necessarily interpret the utterance according to the shared linguistic conventions that exist at the time of the
utterance.”).
46. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998).
47. Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 556 U.S. 560, 569 (2012).
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to live with you may not be harboring, even if you know he shouldn’t
be in the United States.”48
Indeed, some judges have begun to rely on corpus linguistics as the
key to resolving cases dealing with linguistic ambiguity. Associate
Chief Justice Thomas Lee of the Utah Supreme Court, for example,
has relied on corpus linguistics in a variety of contexts.49 In 2016, the
Michigan Supreme Court used corpus linguistics to determine that information as used by the Michigan State Legislature included false as
well as true information.50 And just a few terms ago, Justice Thomas
cited corpus linguistics data in his United States v. Carpenter51 dissent
and an article relying on corpus linguistics data in his Lucia v. SEC52
concurrence (the latter was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch).

D. The Corpora
Today, two of the most relevant and popular corpora for research
on the original meaning of the Constitution are Brigham Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era American English (COFEA) and the
Corpus of Early Modern English (COEME). COFEA is a database
currently comprised of over 154 million words from American documents “including letters, diaries, newspapers, non-fiction books, fiction, sermons, speeches, debates, legal cases, and other legal materials”
from the beginning of the reign of King George III in 1760 to the

48. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044–45 (7th Cir. 2012).
49. See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring)
(using corpus linguistics to confirm that “discharge of a weapon is used overwhelmingly in the
single shot sense”); State v. J.M.S. (In re Interest of J.M.S.,), 280 P.3d 410, 418–19 (Utah 2011)
(Lee, J., concurring) (using corpus linguistics to confirm that the “ordinary and accepted meaning
of the term ‘procedure’ is limited to medical methods”); In re Adoption of Baby E.Z. v. T.I.Z.,
266 P.3d 702, 724 n.21 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (using corpus linguistics to confirm that
the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act’s use of “custody determination” does not reach
adoption proceedings).
50. People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–42 (Mich. 2016).
51. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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death of George Washington in 1799.53 By contrast, COEME is a collection of English books and documents comprised of 40,300 texts
from the years 1475 to 1800.54

E. Two Tools of Corpus Linguistics
There are several corpus tools that can help shed light on ordinary
meaning, but some of the most popular are concordance lines and frequency data. These will be briefly explained so that the reader is better
equipped to understand the research discussed in this Note.

1. Concordance lines
The concordance function (also known as the key word in context
or “KWIC” function) has been aptly described as “the meat-and-potatoes of determining meaning from corpus analysis,”55 because it “allows . . . users to review a particular word or phrase in hundreds of
contexts, all on the same page of running text.”56 Put simply, concordance lines are the strings of text a searchable corpus returns in response
to a query; they provide the crucial context in which different instantiations of the searched term have occurred. By coding or categorizing
a simple random sample of concordance lines, researchers can survey
the sense-distribution of the searched term and extrapolate conclusions about how the term is used in the full corpus.57 Again, this is
something judges have been doing for quite some time, albeit on a
much smaller and more rudimentary scale—take, for example, the
Muscarello Court’s analysis of certain text samples from the King
James Bible, Robinson Crusoe, and Moby Dick.58

53. BYU LAW: LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last visited on
Oct. 23, 2019). “The majority of texts have been pulled from the following six sources: the National Archive Founders Online; William S. Hein & Co., HeinOnline; Text Creation Partnership
(TCP) Evans Bibliography (University of Michigan); Elliot’s Debates; Farrand’s Records; and
the U.S. Statutes-at-Large from the first five Congresses.” Id.
54. Id.
55. Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 308–09.
56. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 30, at 832.
57. Of course, ideally one would code all the concordance lines a search returns—but
unless the number of concordance lines is relatively small, this is usually a daunting task.
58. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998).
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2. Frequency data
Frequency data allow us to see how often a word is used, as well as
how often that word is used in a particular “genre” or register of documents (e.g., legal texts, colloquial texts),59 which in turn may provide
us valuable insights into a word’s meaning.60 In the context of COFEA,
for example, if a phrase appears more frequently in Hein Online documents (a collection of legal texts) than in Evans Early American Imprints documents (a collection of early American books, pamphlets,
and broadsides), we might have reason to believe that the phrase is a
legal term of art, or that at least one sense of the phrase bears a technical or specialized legal meaning.61
IV. T HE “W EAPONIZATION ” OF C ORPUS L INGUISTICS

A. Applications for the Second Amendment
Scholars have long recognized corpus linguistics’ potential in the
Second Amendment debate. In Heller, several linguists submitted an
amicus brief that drew conclusions about the meaning of bear arms
from 115 Founding Era documents.62
This scholarship has continued because the Supreme Court relied
heavily on historical linguistic claims in Heller. While the Court has
never settled on one sense of “ordinary meaning”63 or decided that the
59. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 290.
60. Note that coding is also required to gain this latter insight regarding in which “genres” a certain sense of a word appears. See id. at 291.
61. See id. at 293–94; see also James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the

Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis of American
English from 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 208 (2017).
62. Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English Dennis E. Baron et al. in Support of
Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter Linguists’ Brief].
63. Sometimes the Court has relied on a word’s most common meaning. See, e.g.,
Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 556 U.S. 560, 568 (2012) (“That a definition is broad
enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that sense.”); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (“‘Personal’ ordinarily refers
to individuals. We do not usually speak of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities.”). At other times, members have seemed to adopt a possible meaning as ordinary
meaning. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States 524 U.S. 125, 140 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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original ordinary meaning is always the proper basis for a decision,64
the Heller Court explicitly claimed to be guided by the principle that,
“[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary . . . meaning.”65
Specifically, Heller wrestled with the linguistic ambiguity surrounding several phrases—the right of the people, keep arms, bear
arms, and keep and bear arms as a whole. Even if the Court would have
reached the same conclusion based on other grammatical or historical
claims or policy considerations, how the Founding generation understood the words of the Second Amendment was held up as a key reason
for the outcome in Heller. As such, several scholars have attempted to
use corpus linguistics to test whether the historical linguistic claims
made by Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens are true.

B. Corpus Linguistics Research on the Second Amendment to Date
1. Bear arms
By far the most analyzed portion of the Second Amendment is the
phrase bear arms. This was the focus of the Linguists’ Brief in Heller,
which surveyed 115 instances of bear arms from “books, pamphlets,
broadsides and newspapers from the period between the Declaration
of Independence and the adoption of the Second Amendment.”66 Relying in part on the fact that 110 of these instances “were used in a
clearly military context,” the brief concluded that “the right that is protected is the right of the people to serve in the military and keep military weaponry for such service.”67

64. The Court has not always been so disciplined. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958) (“The Court [has] recognized . . . that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
65. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
66. Linguists’ Brief at 24.
67. Id. at 3, 24.
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One of these linguists, Professor Dennis Baron, has since performed searches using both COFEA and COEME.68 His searches for
bear arms returned 310 hits in COFEA and 1578 hits in COEME.69
After evaluating an impressive 1300 of these concordance lines and removing duplicates, he concluded that 900 instances “refer[red] to war,
soldiering, or other forms of armed action by a group rather than an
individual” while only seven were “ambiguous or carried no military
connotation.”70 Professor Baron argues that this means that “the natural meaning of bear arms in the framers’ day was military or quasimilitary.”71
Using a slightly different collective sense versus individual sense
framework, University of Chicago professors Alison LaCroix and Jason Merchant analyzed 181 references of bear arms from a 1760 to
1795 Google Books search and concluded that 67.4% were used “in a
collective sense,” while just 18.2% were used “in an individual sense.”72
In response to Professor Baron’s preliminary findings73 and Professor LaCroix’s research, Professor Josh Blackman and James Phillips
sampled 50 COFEA concordance lines from 1760 to 1799 and also
concluded that “the overwhelming majority of instances of ‘bear arms’
was in the military context.”74 Notably, Blackman and Phillips
searched COFEA not just for bear arms, but rather for any instance of
68. Dennis Baron, Corpus Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509 (2019).
69. Id. at 510.
70. Id. at 510–11. It is doubtful that searching for the phrase bear arms (rather than
searching for any form of bear within a certain span of arms) is the most comprehensive way to
conduct this research. It is also unclear why all the years of data from 1475 to 1800 would be
relevant for an inquiry into how the framers and ratifiers of the Second Amendment would have
understood the phrase. But since Professor Baron’s framework is based on the military versus
nonmilitary distinction and he found only a handful of examples of nonmilitary uses, having too
wide a timeframe does not seem to have altered the analysis much.
71. Id. at 511.
72. Allison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second Amendment, PANORAMA (August 3, 2018), http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semantics-and-the-meaning-of-the-second-amendment/.
73. Dennis Baron, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About the Meaning of ‘Bear Arms’,
WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antonin-scalia-waswrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac66-5d11-11e8-b2b808a538d9dbd6_story.html.
74. Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second Amendment,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018),) https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-linguistics-andthe-second-amendment/.

150

JONES REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

135]

3/26/2020 9:32 AM

Weaponization of Corpus Linguistics

the words arm or arms within four words of any form of the verb to
bear.
Lawyer and linguist Neal Goldfarb, who began publishing extensive Second Amendment corpus linguistics research as I wrote this
Note,75 has taken a different approach. In fact, he uses a framework
similar to the one I use in Parts IV and V. Instead of jumping straight
to a conclusion on whether the Second Amendment protects a collective right to serve in the militia or an individual right to own and carry
firearms, Goldfarb decided to take the Heller opinion at its word and
discern whether bear arms actually meant to literally carry weapons.76
First, Goldfarb performed preliminary collocation and concordance line analyses on bear and carry and concluded that, “at the time
of the framing of the Constitution, bear was in general not synonymous with carry.”77 More specifically, Goldfarb interpreted this data
to mean that by the time of the Founding, carry was being used more
to discuss the wearing or moving of tangible objects, while bear was
being used more to refer to figurative weights and burdens.78
Second, Goldfarb performed a concordance line analysis on arms
to determine whether its ordinary meaning was synonymous with
weapons.79 After some preliminary research, he concluded that while
arms often did literally mean weapons, there were many senses of arms
that he believed were parts of more figurative or specialized military
phrases (e.g., to arms, force of arms).80 He then performed several corpus searches and concluded that of the 706 concordance lines from
COFEA’s Evans Early American Imprint Series, the ratio of weapons
senses to military senses was 75 (20.5%) to 290 (79.5%), meaning a
75. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, LAWNLINGUISTICS,
https://lawnlinguistics.com/corpora-and-the-second-amendment/ (last updated Aug. 8, 2018)
(listing all Goldfarb’s blog posts on the subject).
76. Goldfarb ultimately tested whether bear arms meant to carry weapons in case of confrontation, holding the Heller Court to its most specific claim.
77. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear”, LAWNLINGUISTICS
(Dec. 16, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/12/16/corpora-and-the-secondamendment-bear/. Notably, Goldfarb restricted his COEME data to the same years available in
COFEA, 1760–1799.
78. Id.
79. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Arms”, LAWNLINGUISTICS
(Feb. 20, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/02/20/corpora-and-the-secondamendment-arms/.
80. Id.
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military sense was 3.8 times as common as a weapons sense.81 Similarly,
of the 685 COEME concordance lines, the ratio was 112 (30%) to 262
(70%), meaning a military sense was 2.3 times as common as a weapons
sense.82 On the other hand, of the 707 concordance lines from
COFEA’s Hein Online and Founders Papers Online, the pattern was
just the opposite—there were 413 weapons senses (66%) to 213 military senses (34%), or nearly 2 times as many weapons senses.83 Goldfarb attributes this discrepancy to the fact that the Founders Papers
Online contained significant correspondence relating to the Revolutionary War.84
Finally, Goldfarb searched COFEA and COEME for all iterations
of arms that occurred within four words of any form of the verb bear
between 1760 and 1799 and found 756 concordance lines.85 Crucially,
he excluded 221 lines—not just those that were patently irrelevant
(e.g., bearing arms as in bearing a coat of arms), but also all proposed
or ratified constitutional amendments referring to the right to bear
arms (a total of 22 lines).86 Goldfarb reasoned that “[g]iven that the
issue to be decided is how the right to keep and bear arms as used in
the Second Amendment was likely to have be[en] understood, there
[is] nothing to be learned from considering uses of that very phrase or
of closely related variants, in a similar context.”87
Goldfarb concluded that of his 535 remaining concordance lines,
only 11 (2%) “unambiguously” used bear arms to mean carry weapons.88 He did, however, admit that he “couldn’t point to a specific factor ruling out the possibility” that an additional 15 lines (2.8%) “would
have been understood to express the ‘natural meaning’ that was declared by Heller.”89 In short, Goldfarb concluded that at least 95% of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. Of course, it is likely that the Second Amendment was also written with the events
of the then-recent Revolutionary War in mind.
85. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear Arms” (Part 2),
LAWNLINGUISTICS (Apr. 30, 2019, 11:18 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/04/30/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-2/.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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all instances of bear arms were used in a more “figurative” military
sense.90

2. Keep arms
Less research has been done on keep arms.91 Blackman and Phillips
searched COFEA for all instances of arm or arms within four words of
any form of the verb to keep, but ultimately they were able to code
only 18 of their sample size of 50 concordance lines.92 Of that limited
sample, they found around half related to keeping arms “in the military
context,” a quarter related to a “private sense,” and the remaining
quarter were ambiguous.93

3. Keep and bear arms
As of this writing, there has been little commentary on the fact that
the phrase keep and bear arms is virtually nonexistent outside the context of the Second Amendment. As this Note reveals, this has significant ramifications for Justice Stevens’s suggestion that the Second
Amendment protects a “unitary right.”

4. The right of the people
Neal Goldfarb has been responsible for virtually all the corpus linguistics commentary on the right of the people. Goldfarb takes issue

90. Id.
91. Neal Goldfarb did make some interesting observations about the nature of the verb
keep and raised doubts about whether it doesn’t also have its own touch of idiomaticity, Neal
Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Keep” (Part 2), LAWNLINGUISTICS (Oct. 21,
2018, 11:13 AM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/10/21/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-keep-part-2/, but he ultimately concluded that he did not see any value in conducting a
specific keep arms analysis. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: Changing My
Mind About a Change of Mind, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Feb. 29, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/02/26/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-changing-my-mind-about-achange-of-mind/ (“After initially declaring that I wouldn’t be posting about the phrase keep arms
because I had nothing interesting to say about it, and then declaring that upon further reflection
I did have something interesting to say, I’ve realized after drafting a post discussing the phrase
that I was right the first time.”).
92. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 74. Blackman and Phillips excluded the other 32 as
either duplicates or quotations of the Second Amendment.
93. Id.
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with the Court’s assumption that those state constitutions that discussed “the people’s right” to defend themselves or that declared “the
people have a right” to bear arms for the defense of themselves “unambiguously” protected an individual rather than a collective right.94
He argues that unless these clauses included additional language such
as “each” or “every citizen,” it is unclear whether they were meant to
protect collective or individual action.95 Searching for both the people’s right and the people have a right in COFEA and COEME, Goldfarb concluded that of 105 relevant concordance lines, 63 (60%) were
clearly discussing collective rights (e.g., “the right to alter the Constitution,” “the right to set up a civil government”), 24 (22.8%) were
“both collective and at least arguably distributive [individual],” one was
ambiguous, and just 17 (16.2%) clearly protected an individual right.96
Goldfarb then performed a separate analysis on the Second
Amendment’s phrase the right of the people and came to similar conclusions. Of 118 relevant hits, he coded 75 (63.6%) as collective, 29
(24.6%) as collective and arguably individual, 7 (6%) as ambiguous,
and only 7 (6%) as clearly individual.97
Goldfarb argues his research “lends weight to the argument that
the right of self-defense protected by [some of] the state constitutional
provisions . . . should be understood as a right of collective self-defense, and therefore as a right associated with service in a militia.”98
This would not only suggest that some lines that could otherwise be
coded as uses of the carrying sense are actually examples of the specialized sense,99 but also that the ultimate “military right” conclusion
drawn by the Heller dissenters was correct. Of course, this finding
would also be consistent with the insurrectionist theory of the Second
Amendment.

94. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Bear Arms” (Part 1), Plus a
Look at “The People”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (Apr. 29, 2019, 2:19 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/ 2019/04/29/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-1-plus-a-look-atthe-people/.
95. Id.
96. Id. Goldfarb excluded any concordance line referencing a right to “bear arms.”
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Since Goldfarb excluded these state constitutional amendments from his analysis, this
point is only relevant for this Note’s coding.
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V. M ETHODOLOGY

There are many linguistic claims in Heller, but this Note addresses
just three: (A) whether the Second Amendment protects a “unitary
right” to “keep and bear arms,” (B) whether at the time of the Founding the more natural meaning of bear arms was carry weapons, and (C)
whether at the time of the Founding the idiomatic sense of bear arms
was always followed by the preposition against.

A. Testing Whether the Second Amendment Protects a “Unitary
Right”
After analyzing the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause and determining that the “people” referenced in the operative clause is limited to those serving in the state militia, Justice Stevens asserted that
the Second Amendment’s protection of the right of the people to “keep
and bear arms” protects a “single right” (or “a duty and a right”) “to
have arms available and ready for military service, and to use them for
military purposes when necessary.”100
This Note tested this claim by searching COFEA for instances of
to keep and bear arms in the decades leading up to the passage of the
Second Amendment. The theory was that if the corpus search returned
many results of this precise phrase, it would be likely that the phrase
was in fact a term of art—particularly if those results tended to be comprised of legal texts. If the search did not produce such results, it would
be much less likely that the phrase was a term of art before the passage
of the Second Amendment.
Likewise, if the corpus data showed that the phrase was used extensively after the writing of the Second Amendment, it would suggest
that the Amendment gave birth to or established keep and bear arms
as a term of art.

B. Testing Whether “Bear Arms” Meant “Carry Weapons”
As the research in Part III shows, corpus linguistics can shed a lot
of light on the phrase bear arms. Most of this research has coded instances of bear arms using either a military sense versus nonmilitary

100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 651 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sense framework or a collective sense versus individual sense framework. But this Note argues that neither of these frameworks is the best
way to determine what bear arms meant in the context of the Second
Amendment—at least not if we want to critique Justice Scalia’s analysis
on its own terms.
That’s because both the military sense versus nonmilitary sense
framework and the collective sense versus individual sense framework
fail to directly address Heller’s central linguistic claim—that bear arms
literally meant carry weapons.101 Instead, these frameworks place a
thumb on the scale in favor of a more limited militia right. Even if bear
arms did exclusively mean carry weapons at the time of the Founding,
it would presumably still be used overwhelmingly in military contexts.
After all, the relevant texts were all written during or near the time of
the Revolutionary War, and weapons are primarily used for combat.102
For these same reasons, the finding that bear arms appeared more often in collective rather than individual contexts seems to prove little.
Blackman and Phillips explained why we cannot simply place corpus
results in “context” buckets as opposed to strict “sense” buckets: “If we
search a corpus for ‘to read,’ we will find more instances of people
reading a newspaper than reading a street sign, even though both instances draw on the same meaning of ‘to read.’“103
So the more relevant inquiry regarding the scope of the right to
keep and bear arms, at least as the Supreme Court sees it, is how often
Founding Era Americans used bear arms in a so-called specialized
sense (i.e. to serve in the military or engage in combat) versus how
often they used bear arms in the carrying sense (i.e. to literally wear,
hold, or wield weapons)—not how often bear arms was used in collective or military contexts versus individual ones.
This Note used this specialized sense versus carrying sense framework even though Justice Scalia ultimately concluded that the Second
101. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (“At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant
to ‘carry.’”); id. at 589 (“If ‘bear arms’ means, as we think, simply the carrying of arms. . . .”).
102. Justice Scalia made this point about the smaller sample used in the Linguists’ Brief:
“It is especially unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a military context in the federal
legal sources (such as records of congressional debate) that have been the focus of petitioners’
inquiry. Those sources would have had little occasion to use it except in discussions about the
standing army and the militia.” Id. at 587.
103. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 74.
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Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.”104 As Justice Stevens noted, “No
party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to have
fashioned it out of whole cloth.”105 Because it is not obvious to me that
the “in case of confrontation” language was necessary to the Court’s
self-defense individual rights reading of the Second Amendment, I believed there was little to be gained by holding the Court to this more
specific linguistic claim. After all, if citizens have an individual right to
carry weapons, that right necessarily includes the right to carry weapons “in case[s] of confrontation”106 or for the purposes of “offensive or
defensive action.”107
We already have an idea of how this specialized sense versus carrying sense framework would work because Goldfarb used it in his Second Amendment corpus linguistics research. But this Note’s research
is still valuable because it disagrees with Goldfarb’s coding in several
respects.
For example, there are several uses of bear arms that Goldfarb automatically coded as “figurative”—e.g., refuse to bear arms, exempted/excused/released from bearing arms, able to bear arms, capable of bearing arms, fit to bear arms, bear arms in defence of, etc.—
that I did not. While I interpreted many of these instances of bear arms
to be using the figurative or specialized sense, the context seemed to
suggest that others were invoking the carrying sense, and I coded them
accordingly.
Goldfarb also decided to exclude from his analysis all proposed and
final drafts of the Second Amendment and its variants. While Goldfarb
raises valid concerns about the wisdom of assuming that state constitutions unambiguously protected an individual right, that is not the

104. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia may have limited himself in an effort
to claim he was simply applying Justice Ginsburg’s (modern) definition of “carry” from Muscarello and make a jab at the dissent: “In Muscarello . . . Justice [Ginsburg] wrote that ‘[s]urely a
most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment . . . indicate[s]: wear, bear,
or carry [. . . ] for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a
case of conflict with another person.’ We think that Justice [Ginsburg] accurately captured the
natural meaning of ‘bear arms.’” Id. at 584 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Neal Goldfarb has commented extensively on the Heller Court’s
faulty incorporation of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Muscarello. Goldfarb, supra note 94.
106. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
107. Id. at 584.
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relevant question. All the specialized sense versus carrying sense
framework cares about is whether these state Second Amendments employed bear arms in the specialized sense or the carrying sense. As such,
I included and coded Second Amendment variants if they appeared in
my random sample.
This Note also departed from past research’s tendency to search
only for the exact term bear arms because, like Blackman and Phillips
and Goldfarb, I believed that a wider and more flexible search query—
i.e., one that identified all instances of arm or arms within a certain
range of any form of the verb bear—was necessary to capture other
variations of the phrase that are just as relevant to determining the
phrase’s meaning. But while this Note’s analysis expanded on past research by searching for all instances of arm or arms within six words of
bear (as opposed to just searching for bear arms or for arm or arms
within four words of bear) and by coding a larger sample than Blackman and Phillips, Goldfarb deserves credit for searching COEME in
addition to COFEA and for coding all the concordance lines his
searches returned. Still, this Note’s methodological differences with
past researchers constitutes a significant contribution to the literature
on this topic.

C. Testing Whether the Idiom “Bear Arms” Requires the
Preposition “Against”
This Note also used corpus linguistics to test whether Justice Scalia
was correct when he claimed that the phrase bear arms bore its figurative meaning only when followed by the proposition against. The hypothesis was simple: if a corpus search revealed instances of the idiom
being used without against, it would undermine the majority’s conclusion that the preposition was always required.
VI. R ESULTS
This Note’s corpus data revealed that while both the majority and
main dissenting opinions in Heller purported to rely on the original
understanding of the Second Amendment, they each made erroneous
historical linguistic claims. Because the Supreme Court only considered a limited number of sources before making broad generalizations
about the historical meaning of bear arms, neither camp accurately
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portrayed the complex and nuanced reality of how the phrase was used
at the time the Second Amendment was ratified.
While several scholars have begun applying corpus linguistics to
the debate over the original meaning of the Second Amendment, this
Note’s most novel contribution is its evidence that the Second Amendment protects both a right of the people to “keep arms” and a separate
right to “bear arms.” Furthermore, while the specialized sense of bear
arms (i.e., serving in the military or engaging in collective armed conflict) appears to have been used significantly more often than the carrying sense of bear arms, the latter still appears to have been used more
often than past research may have suggested. Finally, the data confirm
past research suggesting that Justice Scalia was wrong when he asserted
that the more “idiomatic” sense of bear arms bore this meaning only
when followed by the preposition against.

A. “Keep and Bear Arms” Was Likely Not a Legal Term of Art or
“Unitary Right” at the Time of the Founding.
After analyzing the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause and determining that the “people” referenced in the operative clause is limited to those serving in the state militia, Justice Stevens asserted that
the Second Amendment’s protection of the right of the people to “keep
and bear arms” protects a “single right” (or “a duty and a right”) “to
have arms available and ready for military service, and to use them for
military purposes when necessary.”108 But corpus linguistics data suggest just the opposite.
A COFEA search for all instances in which any variant of keep
(e.g., kept, keeping) appeared within six words of any variant of bear
(e.g., bore, bearing) resulted in 105 hits. Of these, fully 80 were irrelevant because they discussed other senses of keep (e.g., “keep . . . as
near the coast as possible”), bear (e.g., “bear good fruit”), or both (e.g.,
“I cannot bear to keep anything that is comfortable from you”). Another 19 were duplicates of the Second Amendment, its proposed and
rejected drafts, or state equivalents (the originals were included).109
108. Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Goldfarb’s concluded that all the results from his search for keep and bear arms were
from drafts and proposals related to the Second Amendment itself. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and
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Of the remaining six hits, only two could plausibly be interpreted
as contemplating a “unitary right.”110 One is Virginia’s 1788 proposal
for the Second Amendment. The other is a newspaper article by Samuel Adams, in which he claimed that Massachusetts’ Declaration of
Rights protects “a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.”
But in actuality, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides
that, “[t]he people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence.”111 While one could place more weight on the singular
article a in “a right,” I followed Justice Stevens’s lead and gave more
weight to the additional “to” before “bear.”112 In any case, since the
article the in the right of the people to keep and bear arms is just as
singular as the article a in a right to keep and to bear arms, saying a
definitively describes a unitary right and therefore the Second Amendment enshrines a unitary right would seem to assume the conclusion.
Three of the remaining six hits supported the idea that to keep and
bear arms contemplates two distinct rights. Two hits were rejected
draft versions of the Second Amendment, which protected the right
“to keep and bear arms” but immediately exempted those “religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms” from doing so—in other words, religious
objectors were not exempt from both bearing and keeping arms, just
from bearing arms. The third hit was Tennessee’s 1796 Constitution,
which reads: “That the freemen of this State have a right to Keep and
to bear Arms for their common defence.”113 For reasons just discussed,
this extra to suggests that the phrase protected two separate rights.
Simply put, the frequency data and concordance line analysis
showed that, as Justice Scalia predicted,114 keep and bear arms as a
complete phrase was not a common phrase at the time of the Founding, let alone a legal term of art for a “unitary right.”

the Second Amendment, “Keep and Bear Arms” (Part 1) (updated), LAWNLINGUISTICS (July
29, 2019, 8:18 PM) https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/07/29/corpora-and-the-second-amendment-keep-and-bear-arms-part-1/.
110. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646.
111. MASS. CONST., art. 17 (emphasis added).
112. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s discussion of these
words treats them as two ‘phrases’—as if they read ‘to keep’ and ‘to bear.’”).
113. TENN. CONST. § 26 (1796) (emphasis added).
114. Heller, 554 U.S. at 591 (majority opinion).
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B. “Bear Arms” Was Used More Often in the Specialized Sense than
the Literal Carrying Sense at the Time of the Founding
While past corpus linguistics research has shown that bear arms
was used primarily in “military” or “collective” contexts, this Note
makes the more nuanced finding that bear arms was used more often
in the “figurative” specialized sense than the “literal” carrying sense at
the time of the Founding.
A COFEA search for all the instances in which any variant of bear
was found within six words115 of arm or arms resulted in 727 results.
To get a simple random sample, 329 concordance lines were selected
at random for analysis.116 Of these, 105 were either duplicates or irrelevant to the present inquiry (e.g., “we bore him in our arms”). Of the
remaining 224 hits, the specialized sense of bear arms occurred an impressive 147 times, or in 65.6% of the (remaining) relevant sample.
The carrying sense, by contrast, occurred a respectable 47 times, or in
21% of the relevant sample. I judged the remaining 30 hits (13.4% of
the sample) too ambiguous to place in one camp or the other.
As predicted, many instances of bear arms in the literal carrying
sense still occurred in military contexts. For example, in a 1778 letter
to George Washington, Alexander Hamilton proposed a regulation to
disarm those officers and supporting staffers of the Continental Army
that did not actually use their arms in combat:
Great quantities of arms and ammunition have been destroyed,

by being in the possession of men who do not use them in time
of action. To prevent this, for the future, no arms, accoutrements, or ammunition, is to be delivered to those under the
following description, viz: General and staff officers, waiters,
waggoners, camp colour men, and all those who do not bear
arms in time of action.117

115. This is the widest possible search range on COFEA, and more than enough to capture
relevant iterations of bear arms.
116. This sample is large enough to achieve a 95% confidence level with a margin of error
of ±4%.
117. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (before Jan. 29, 1778),
NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0353 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added).
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This was not an isolated instance; many sources discussed those
“able to bear arms” as a subset of the militia, indicating that not all
those who served in the militia were considered to be “bearing arms”:
• I prevailed upon the Baron to permit their return, both because several of the boys had been and might be enlisted

for the war, and serve very well for music till they grow big
enough to bear arms; and because we wanted them for the
purpose of guarding stores here, in the room of better men
who might be sent to the army.118
• [I]t is strongly and earnestly enjoined, upon the commanding officers of corps to make all their men who are able to
bear arms (except the necessary guards) march in the ranks
. . . .119
Other notable examples of the carrying sense being used in military contexts are those letters, statutes, and general orders that spoke
of bearing arms as a subset of militia duties:
• They received from the enemy bounty money, pay, clothing
and subsistence, bore arms, did guard duty, and often were
in action against us.120
• That in case any person liable to appear and bear arms at
muster as aforesaid, shall neglect or refuse to appear completely armed and furnished as aforesaid . . . shall forfeit
and pay a sum not exceeding twenty shillings . . . .121

118. Letter from William Davies to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 21, 1781), NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-05-02-0260 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added).
119. Letter from George Washington on General Orders (Aug. 23, 1777), NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-1102-0047 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added).
120. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Turpin (July 29, 1783), NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-02-0260 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2019) (emphasis added).
121. Georgia Acts and Resolutions 1735-1786 (emphasis added).
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• [A]ll male persons from sixteen years of age to sixty, to
train . . . shall bear arms, and duly attend all musters, and
military exercises, of the respective troops and companies
where they are listed or belong . . . .122
It is possible but awkward to say that men must show up for musters and serve in the militia—after all, wouldn’t showing up for musters
and military exercises be part of “serving in the militia”? And it seems
even more redundant to say that men should serve in the militia and
participate in the militia’s activities. But it is eminently reasonable to
clarify that men should appear with their weapons to participate in military exercises, or carry weapons while participating in military exercises. After all, Georgia actually fined those who reported for duty
without being “completely armed and furnished.”123
Goldfarb argues that:
Although militia service involved physically carrying weapons,
that wasn’t all that it involved. There were other obligations as
well, such as attending musters; providing one’s own firearm,
powder, and ammunition; and most importantly, fighting, as
needed, in military actions. It seems more likely to me that
when bear arms was used in connection with the duty to bear
arms, it was intended and understood to denote the whole constellation of activities comprising bearing arms, and not just
the action of carrying weapons.124
But this hardly resolves the redundancy problem highlighted
above—if bear arms denoted “the whole constellation” of the militia’s
activities, why was it necessary to say that men should bear arms and
participate in those other activities? One possible answer is that these

122.
123.
124.

New Hampshire Temporary Law, Acts and Laws 1759-1776 (emphasis added).
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, “Bear Arms” (Part 3)
[UPDATED], LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 10, 2019, 3:38 PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/
2019/07/10/ corpora-and-the-second-amendment-bear-arms-part-3/.
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sources were simply using “and” in the exemplary rather than the conjunctive sense (e.g., “John should be a good boy and do his homework.”). But that cannot be the whole answer because there are sources
explicitly distinguishing between bearing arms and other militia activities.125
Unsurprisingly, the literal carrying sense of bear arms was also
used in individual and civilian contexts:
• A soldier . . . sold an old rusty musket to a countryman for
three dollars, who brought vegetables to market. This
could be no crime in the market-man, who had an undoubted right to purchase, and bear arms.126
• I fervently hoped that no new exigence would occur, compelling me to use the arms that I bore in my own defence.127
Of course, by definition, examples of the specialized sense of bear
arms were limited to instances of military service or combat. They
were also almost exclusively limited to “collective” contexts.128
In sum, this preliminary corpus data raises doubts about whether
one can dismiss the Heller Court’s adoption of the literal reading of
bear arms (even if it ultimately only makes up 21% of this Note’s sample). As discussed in Part VI, ideally additional corpus linguistics research and other tools of constitutional interpretation will be used to

125. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Turpin (July 29, 1783), NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-06-020260 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (“They received from the enemy bounty money, pay, clothing
and subsistence, bore arms, did guard duty, and often were in action against us.”) (emphasis
added).
126. JOHN TRUMBALL, M’FINGAL: A MODERN EPIC POEM, IN FOUR CANTOS 114 n.37
(1839). Relatedly, this also suggests the “right to bear arms” means the “right to carry weapons.”
127. CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, EDGAR HUNTLY; OR, MEMOIRS OF A
SLEEPWALKER 180 (1799).
128. But see Letter to George Washington from Benjamin Neilly (Apr. 22, 1781), NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov /?q=%20Author%3A%22Neilly
%2C%20Benjamin%22&s=1111311121&r=1 (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (“I therefore find myself under the disagreeable Necessity of applying to your Excellency in support of an Injured and
traduced reputation; and while I have the Honor of bearing Arms in defence of my own Rights,
and that of my fellow Creatures, I hope I shall not be allowed to remain long under the imputation of Arrogant and wanton Columny. . . .”) (emphasis added).

164

JONES REVIEWED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

135]

3/26/2020 9:32 AM

Weaponization of Corpus Linguistics

shed further light on the original understanding of the right to keep
and bear arms.

C. The Specialized Sense of “Bear Arms” Did Not Require the
Preposition “Against”
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion that bear arms “unequivocally
bore [its] idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition
‘against,’”129 only 36 hits, or 24.5% of all 147 specialized sense hits in
the sample, used the preposition against. So, not only did this “idiom”
appear without the preposition against, but the specialized sense of
bear arms was three times more likely to be recorded without it. While
Justice Scalia’s other claims and ultimate conclusion regarding the Second Amendment may still be correct (or at least subject to further research and debate), it is emphatically not true that the preposition
against was necessary to convey the specialized sense of bear arms at
the time of the Founding.
VII. C AVEATS AND F UTURE R ESEARCH
The research laid out in Part V supports the conclusion that by far
the most commonly recorded use of bear arms at the time of the
Founding was the specialized sense of serving in the military or engaging in combat. This comports with Goldfarb’s research using the same
framework and is arguably consistent with the conclusions of other
scholars suggesting that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of a right
to “bear arms” is limited to military service. But this Note’s research
also reveals that over one-fifth of recorded uses of bear arms in
COFEA employed the phrase in the carrying sense. While the literal
carrying sense should still be recognized as a minority sense, it is not
an all-but-nonexistent sense like Goldfarb and others suggest. In fact,
the percentage of bear arms uses that invoke the literal sense may actually be larger.130
All these findings should be taken together with the following caveats:

129.
130.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 (2008).
As I will explain, it is also possible (but less likely) that the number might be smaller.
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A. Methodological Issues
1. Coding religious objectors
One potential problem with this Note’s coding is that many of the
references to bear arms—22.8% of the relevant sample—were used in
discussions about religious groups (Quakers, Jews, and early Christians) that were morally opposed to “bearing arms.” In over 75% of
these instances, bear arms still seemed to clearly refer to the specialized
sense, and these lines were coded as such. However, in nearly 20% of
the concordance lines in this subset, the phrase seemed to refer to religious opposition to carrying weapons in addition to mustering or engaging in military activities. These instances, some of which are provided below, were coded as carrying sense iterations:
• Do you maintain a faithful Testimony against Oaths, an
hireling Ministry, bearing Arms, Training, or Military Services, being concerned in any fraudulent or clandestine
Trade[?]131
• Whereas there are in divers Parts of this Province several of
the People called Quakers . . . and from a religious Principle, are conseientiously [sic] scrupulous of bearing Arms,

or appearing or answering to their Names in Muster
Fields. . . .132
• [T]he Jews, being tied up by the religion, laws, and constitutions of their country, not to bear arms, travel, or so
much as provide themselves necessaries for life, upon the
day of their sabbath, are thereby rendered incapable of attending the duties and services of the war. . . .133
131. PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS,
RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND CHRISTIAN ADVICES OF THE YEARLY MEETING OF FRIENDS FOR
PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW JERSEY, FIRST HELD AT BURLINGTON IN THE YEAR 1681, AND
FROM 1685 TO 1760, INCLUSIVE, ALTERNATELY IN BURLINGTON AND PHILADELPHIA: AND
SINCE AT PHILADELPHIA. : ALPHABETICALLY DIGESTED AND PRINTED BY DIRECTION OF THE
SAID MEETING 110 (1797) (emphasis added).
132. Laws of North Carolina (1770) (emphasis added).
133. THOMAS BRADSHAW, THE WHOLE GENUINE AND COMPLETE WORKS OF
FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, THE LEADER AND AUTHENTIC JEWISH HISTORIAN AND CELEBRATED
WARRIOR (1792) (emphasis added).
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• Celsus . . . had charged the christians with refusing to bear
arms, and to enter into military employment.134
In short, depending on what historical research reveals about the
relevant beliefs and practices of Quakers, Jews, and early Christians,
the composition of the sample might change substantially. True, I only
coded two concordance lines respecting religious objectors as “unclear,” so tipping both of these to the carrying sense column would
only increase that sense’s share of the sample to 21.9%. But if historical
research demonstrated that all bear arms references involving religious
objectors should be coded as carrying instances, the relevant sample’s
share of specialized to carrying would be a much closer 48.2% to
39.3%.135
The Heller dissenters argued, not unreasonably, that religious exemptions supported a specialized sense reading of bear arms.136 But as
the Heller majority countered, surely these exemptions were not
meant “to exempt from military service those who objected to going
to war but had no scruples about personal gunfights.”137

2. Coding those capable, able, and fit to bear arms
This Note also struggled with the question of what exactly was
meant by phrases such as able to bear arms, capable of bearing arms,
and big or fit enough to bear arms. These phrases, which can plausibly

134. ANTHONY BENEZET, SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT
SUBJECTS; VIZ. ON WAR AND ITS INCONSISTENCY WITH THE GOSPEL. OBSERVATIONS ON
SLAVERY. AND REMARKS ON THE NATURE AND BAD EFFECTS OF SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS
(1778) (emphasis added). Admittedly, it is possible that the use of and in this line was not conjunctive.
135. Admittedly, this is extremely unlikely—not just because it seems more likely that religious objectors were opposed to war rather than the carrying of weapons, but because even if
these objectors’ beliefs did include an aversion to carrying weapons, believers and nonbelievers
alike could still have been referring only to the objectors’ opposition to military service. Still, this
is an interesting question that could flip a non-trivial number of less clear-cut specialized sense
uses to carrying sense uses (and vice versa).
136. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 660–61 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Goldfarb also argues that religious exemptions point toward a non-literal reading of bear arms.
Goldfarb, supra note 124.
137. Heller, 554 U.S. at 590. I acknowledge that this might be one instance in which it
matters whether bear arms is interpreted to mean carry weapons in case of confrontation rather
than carry weapons.
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refer either to individuals’ ability or eligibility to serve in the military
or their ability to carry (and possibly handle) weapons, occurred 51
times, making up 22.8% of the entire relevant bear arms sample. Of
those, 20 hits (39.2%) were coded as specialized sense uses, 8 hits
(15.7%) were coded as carrying sense uses, and a significant 23 hits
(45.1%) were deemed too ambiguous to code.
As in the case of the religious objectors, there were some examples
that seemed to invoke the specialized (military service) sense:
• The established rule of computing the number of men, capable of bearing arms in any nation, is by taking a fifth part
of the whole people.138
• What is the number of men in America able to bear arms,

or of disciplined militia?139
In other instances, the texts describing those able/capable/fit to
bear arms seemed to use the carrying sense. I made this inference
whenever the specialized sense would have created a redundancy (such
as when texts referred to those able to bear arms as a subset of a military
unit), or when texts went on to emphasize that those unable to bear
arms were also unable to endure the rigors of military service:
• [I]t is strongly and earnestly enjoined, upon the commanding officers of corps to make all their men who are able to
bear arms (except the necessary guards) march in the
ranks. . . .140
• Next to these, the body of warriors, which comprehends all
that are able to bear arms, hold their rank.141

138. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED: OR, A MORE IMPARTIAL AND
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE COLONIES,
INTENDED AS A FURTHER VINDICATION OF THE CONGRESS 72 (1775).
139. THE HISTORY OF THE WAR IN AMERICA, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER
COLONIES (1779) (emphasis added).
140. General Orders (Aug. 23, 1777), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0047 (last visited Oct. 25,
2019) (emphasis added).
141. JONATHAN CARVER, TRAVELS THROUGH THE INTERIOR PARTS OF NORTHAMERICA, IN THE YEARS 1766, 1767, AND 1768 260 (1778).
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• Neither Negroes (being Slaves) old Men, or Boys, unable to
bear Arms, & to endure the fatigues of the Campaign, nor
Persons labouring under any bodily infirmity whatsoever
are to be allowed to pass Muster, of which you are to take
due Notice.142
• [T]o protect, or to avenge women, orphans, and ecclesiastics, who could not bear arms in their own defence . . . .143
Some may disagree with these categorizations, as Neal Goldfarb
has, but it is difficult to code phrases like able/capable/fit to bear
arms because they may very well represent a separate, second specialized sense of bear arms (or what the Court might call a separate bear
arms idiom)—a shorthand for people of a certain age and physicality.145
If that is true, it is somewhat nonsensical to try to categorize able/capable/fit to bear arms phrases within this Note’s specialized sense versus carrying sense framework (at least if we limit the specialized sense
to mean only those serving in the military or waging war). In the end,
I deemed many of these hits (45.1%) too ambiguous to code. More
research is needed to determine whether these phrases tell us anything
at all about the frequency with which Founding Era Americans used
bear arms in the literal sense.
144

142. Commission to Robert Breck (Jan. 24, 1776), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-03-02-0126 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2019).
143. WILLIAM ROBERTSON, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE FIFTH,
EMPEROR OF GERMANY 60 (1771) (emphasis added).
144. See Goldfarb, supra note 124 (“[T]he relevance of the military context is that it makes
it likely that bear arms was used (and understood) to convey the idiomatic military meaning that
the majority in Heller rejected. The salient issue in these examples was the overall ability of people to perform military service, not merely their ability to carry weapons (for whatever purpose).
And that would presumably have been reflected in the meaning that the authors meant to convey
and that readers understood.”).
145. Goldfarb argues this would also point to an idiomatic military sense of bear arms:
“Whereas the duty to serve in the militia applied only to those above a given age, I haven’t seen
any indication that there were any minimum age requirements for being allowed to carry weapons. On the contrary, it appears that children learned to use firearms at a young age, and the fact
that males were required to do militia service starting in their teenage years suggests that by that
stage in life, they already knew how to use weapons. Unless I’m mistaken about the history, therefore, bear arms as used in [“big enough to bear arms” or “of age to bear arms”] meant ‘perform
military service’ or ‘act as a warrior.’” Id.
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Once again, this determination could change the results of Part V
rather dramatically. If it were determined that all instances of able/capable/fit to bear arms currently coded as ambiguous would be better
assigned to the carrying sense category, the carrying sense use of bear
arms would increase its share of the relevant sample from 21% to
31.3%. And if it were determined that all instances of able/capable/fit
to bear arms currently coded as examples of the specialized sense were
also better assigned to the carrying sense category, the specialized
sense to carrying sense breakdown of the original relevant sample
would go from a decisive 65.6% to 21% to a muddled 56.7% to
40.2%.146

3. The specialized sense versus carrying sense framework generally,
and “keep arms” as a clue
This last observation segues into the most important caveat of all—
the proposed specialized sense versus carrying sense framework, while
perhaps better suited to testing the Heller Court’s claims than the military sense versus nonmilitary sense framework or the collective sense
versus individual sense framework, may still be incomplete and in need
of refinement. It is not entirely clear that the specialized sense of bear
arms is all that separated from the carrying sense of bear arms.147 For
example, in most instances, when Founding Era Americans served in
the military or went to war, they not only “bore arms” in the sense that
they served in the military or waged war—they also “bore arms” in the
sense that they carried weapons. So, in theory, even the most “literal”
use of bear arms—not just the able/capable/fit to bear arms use—could
146. It is more likely that all instances of able/capable/fit to bear arms were used in the
carrying sense than it is that all instances of religious objectors refusing to bear arms were used
in the carrying sense. Many of those able/capable/fit to bear arms concordance lines ultimately
categorized as examples of the specialized or carrying senses were not obviously at home in those
buckets. Of course, this also means that the specialized sense to carrying sense breakdown might
be even more starkly in favor of the specialized sense (79.5% to 17.4% if all able/capable/fit to
bear arms uses currently categorized as examples of “carrying” or “unclear” were recategorized
as “specialized”).
147. See Goldfarb, supra note 85 (“Earlier in this post, when talking about the sense of
bear arms as meaning ‘carry weapons,’ I used a hedge when I referred to that sense as ‘what would
generally be thought of as its literal sense.’ I did that partly because the distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ language is more complicated than you might think, but more importantly
because the distinction is especially problematic in the case of bear arms.”).
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be indistinguishable from the so-called idiomatic (or rather “less literal”) use of bear arms. At least, there may not be enough context for
modern-day linguists to determine exactly which sense was being used
in military-related documents.
If this is true, the literal carrying of weapons may have been frequently—perhaps even overwhelmingly—lost as a subset of the specialized or “idiomatic” sense of bear arms. This idea is consistent with
Justice Scalia’s theory that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment simply announced the main impetus or purpose behind the provision; that is, the clause merely expressed the most prototypical exercise of the broader individual right to own and carry weapons.148 In
short, the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment may actually be
more expansive (i.e. individual) than the research in Part V suggests.
Because the carrying sense of bear arms was still common at the
time of the Founding (and the aforementioned caveats suggest that it
may have been even more common than this Note’s principal findings
suggest), the Court may need to continue to rely on other textual and
historical tools (such as the grammar cannon,149 states’ Second Amendment equivalents, early American firearm regulations and practices,
the Second Amendment’s connection to the English Bill of Rights,
etc.) to determine the original understanding and current legal scope
of the Second Amendment. Corpus linguistics data are most reliable
when they are harmonized with other tools of interpretation.150
In the case of the Second Amendment, a syntactic analysis confirmed by additional corpus linguistics research could do much to resolve the question in favor of an individual rights interpretation. Specifically, since it is clear that to keep and bear arms was not a term of
art, much could be gleaned from a corpus linguistics analysis on the
right to “keep arms.” No one has yet suggested that keep arms has (or
148.
149.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577–78 (2008).
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 140 (2012) (“Words are to be given the meaning that
proper grammar and usage would assign them.”).
150. Professor Larry Solum has argued that we may only be “reasonably confident that we
have recovered the original public meaning of the constitutional text” through a sort of “triangulation” of corpus linguistics, immersion in the conceptual and linguistic world of the members
of the Founding Era, and a study of the constitutional record. Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating
Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L.
REV. 1621, 1681–82.
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had) an “idiomatic meaning” quite like bear arms did and does—although Neal Goldfarb has made some interesting findings regarding
how keep in general may have idiomaticity.151 For now, however, it
seems likely that keeping arms simply described the private possession
(and possibly maintenance) of weapons. Confirmation that keep arms
was used more “literally” in the Founding Era would strongly imply
that bear arms was also meant to be taken more “literally” (i.e. in the
carrying sense) in the context of the Second Amendment, where it appears in conjunction with keep. As Justice Scalia noted, the phrase keep
and bear arms would be extremely incoherent if keep arms were interpreted literally and bear arms were interpreted figuratively: “The word
‘Arms’ would have two different meanings at once: ‘weapons’ (as the
object of ‘keep’) and (as the object of ‘bear’) one-half of an idiom. It
would be rather like saying ‘He filled and kicked the bucket’ to mean
‘He filled the bucket and died.’ Grotesque.”152 It is hard to imagine this
“one-half of an idiom” reading surviving if keep arms were confirmed
to be purely literal.153

4. Limitations of COFEA
The database itself also has limitations. First, it would be beneficial
to confirm this Note’s research with another corpus, such as COEME.
As previously noted, Neal Goldfarb has already performed such a
search. However, that search only looked for iterations of arms within
four words of any form of the word bear—and technology currently
allows us to search up to six words on either side of a word. He also
eliminated any concordance lines with language that tracked too

151. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment: “Keep” (Part 2),
LAWNLINGUISTICS (Oct. 21, 2018), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2018/10/21/corpora-and-thesecond- amendment-keep-part-2/.
152. Heller, 554 U.S. at 587.
153. For an argument that it is possible to have arms be idiomatic for bear arms but literal
for keep arms in to keep and bear arms, see Goldfarb, supra note 109; Neal Goldfarb, Corpora
and the Second Amendment: “Keep and Bear Arms” (Part 2), LAWNLINGUISTICS (Aug. 23,
2019, 10:01 PM) https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/08/23/corpora-and-the-second-amendmentpart-2/ (“The uses of bear arms that I’ve discussed provide evidence supporting the conclusion
that the phrase could have been used idiomatically in the Second Amendment, even though that
would entail that arms mean two things at once.”).
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closely to the Second Amendment. For reasons given earlier, I disagree
with that decision.
Second, COFEA is itself a moving target—you cannot rely on your
data for too long. COFEA is constantly growing as BYU adds documents in an effort to make the corpus more representative. This means
that the searches I did when I started this Note at the end of 2018 will
not be as comprehensive as the searches I can do when this Note is
published. COFEA is also imperfect because it largely represents the
language of elite white males,154 and lacks sources from Founding Era
newspapers and the state ratification debates.155

5. Author bias
The last caveat I would add is that this Note’s concordance line
coding was obviously the product of my own intuition and biases. Ideally, coding decisions are reviewed by multiple people and decisions
are subject to quality control.156 Again, it is precisely the replicability
and falsifiability of corpus linguistics that makes it such a refreshingly
transparent enterprise.

B. Areas for Further Research
1. The right of the people
There is also much to be gained from supplemental corpus linguistics research on the phrase the right of the people,157 as the main Heller
opinions disagreed on whether the phrase was used more often to refer
to individual rights or collective rights.158

154. See Lee & Phillips, supra note 34, at 294–95. On the other hand, it was essentially all
elite white males who were writing and ratifying the Second Amendment.
155. Id. at 295. The lack of newspapers, at least, is a “less serious” problem because founding-era newspapers tended to be “a collection of articles, letters, essays, etc., rather than news
articles written in a distinctive style.” Id.
156. See, e.g., Stephanie H. Barclay et al., Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause:
A Corpus Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 537 (2019).
157. Of course, if the specific phrase right of the people is determined not to be a term of
art, a broader search (such as searching for all instances in which people comes within six words
of right or rights) would be a more thorough inquiry.
158. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008).
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Goldfarb gives us reason to believe that the right of the people was
most frequently used in conjunction with rights exercised as a group.159
He argues that the people referred to in the Second Amendment
should therefore be read as limited to those that were of the militia,
not the people generally.160 This would contrast sharply with our current understanding of the people in the Fourth Amendment, which has
been interpreted to protect individual rights.161
Professor Akhil Reed Amar also argues that the people in the Second Amendment should be synonymous with militia, focusing on an
early draft of the Second Amendment’s reference to “a well regulated
militia, composed of the body of the people.”162 But saying the militia

159. See Goldfarb, supra note 91.
160. Neal Goldfarb, Corpora and the Second Amendment, “The Right (of the People)
to . . . Bear Arms”, LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 16, 2019, 2:54PM), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2019/07/16/ corpora-and-the-second-amendment-the-right-of-the-people-to-beararms/.
161. But see Amar, supra note 14 (“The rest of the Bill of Rights confirms this communitarian reading. The core of the First Amendment’s assembly clause, which textually abuts the
Second Amendment, is the right of ‘the people’—in essence, voters—to ‘assemble’ in constitutional conventions and other political conclaves. So, too, the core rights retained and reserved to
‘the people’ in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were rights of the people collectively to govern
themselves democratically. The Fourth Amendment is trickier: ‘The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.’ Here, the collective ‘people’ wording is paired with more individualistic
language of ‘persons.’ And these words obviously focus on the private domain, protecting individuals in their private homes more than in the public square. Why, then, did the Fourth use the
words ‘the people’ at all? Probably to highlight the role that jurors—acting collectively and representing the electorate—would play in deciding which searches were reasonable and how much
to punish government officials who searched or seized improperly. An early draft of James Madison’s amendment protecting jury rights helps make this linkage obvious and also resonates with
the language of the Second Amendment: ‘[T]he trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the
rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.’ Note the obvious echoes here—‘security’ (Second
Amendment), ‘secure’ (Fourth Amendment), and ‘securities’ (draft amendment); ‘shall not be infringed,’ ‘shall not be violated,’ and ‘ought to remain inviolate’; and, of course, ‘the right of the
people’ in all three places.”).
162. See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 146 HARV. L. REV.
145, 166 (2008) (“[T]he otherwise stilted syntax of the Amendment, with its reference to the
‘militia’ in the opening and the ‘people’ in the closing, makes the most sense and becomes the
least stilted when we read these two key nouns, ‘militia’ and ‘people,’ as synonyms. Here is the
key linkage between the Amendment’s two parts. In eighteenth-century republican ideology, the
(general) militia were the people. Indeed, an earlier version of the Amendment made this implicit
syntactical equation textually explicit by referring to ‘a well regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people.’ Although this extra verbiage clarified the Amendment’s substance, it clunked
up the style of an already grammatically complicated sentence and eventually got dropped. Even
so, the equation of the militia with the people is implicit in the very syntax and flow of the final
Amendment as a whole when read against its background of eighteenth century republican ideology.”).
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is composed of “the body of the people” seems to suggest that the militia is a subset or part of “the people,” not synonymous with “the people.” In other words, the Second Amendment could simply be explaining that since the militia (a subset of the people) is necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people (more generally) to have
and carry weapons shall not be infringed.
If research shows that the people of the Second Amendment are
the same as the people in the Fourth Amendment, then it seems much
more likely that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to own and carry weapons, just as the Fourth Amendment protects an
individual right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Of
course, it is theoretically possible to protect an individual right to serve
in the militia, but it is unclear if this would have been considered a
preexisting, negative, natural right at the time of the Founding, let
alone one deemed worthy of inclusion in the Bill of Rights.

2. Keep arms
As noted in Part V, further analysis on the phrase keep arms could
provide insight into which sense of bear arms the Second Amendment
employs. If keep arms is confirmed to be literal, it becomes much more
likely that bear arms was used literally as well.

C. The Limitations of Corpus Linguistics
It is important to remember that corpus linguistics is just one tool
of constitutional interpretation. Professor Larry Solum has argued that
corpus linguistics should be “triangulated” with an immersion in the
texts of the relevant time period and community, as well as a deep understanding of the constitutional record.163 This seems especially prudent in the Heller debate because Justice Scalia relied on many important historical claims that corpus linguistics can do very little to
confirm or deny. If, for example, we accept that the Second Amendment is simply the more expansive offspring of the English Bill of
Rights,164 our frequency data and concordance line analysis should arguably carry less weight in the calculus.

163. Solum, supra note 150, at 1681–82.
164. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–95 (2008).
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VIII. C ONCLUSION
Much more corpus linguistics research can and should be done to
help shed light on Heller’s linguistic claims, just as more historical research can and should be done to shed light on Heller’s historical
claims.
For now, we can have greater confidence that (1) the Second
Amendment protects two distinct rights; (2) at the time of the Founding, the literal “carrying” sense of bear arms was somewhat common
but not overwhelmingly so; and (3) that at the time of the Founding
the more “idiomatic” or specialized sense of bear arms did not require
the preposition against. Of course, these findings represent something
of a mixed bag for both those who argue that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right and those who argue that it protects the
more limited right to bear arms in connection with a state militia.
But it is better to have a mixed bag than a bag of wish fulfillment.
If we are serious about originalism and the original ordinary meaning
inquiry in particular, we must be willing to consider and grapple with
all of the available data. In this day and age, that means engaging with
the data made available through corpus linguistics.

Josh Jones
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